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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TIIIOKOL CHE~IICAL CORPO-
IL\TIO~, a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant 
vs. 
UXITED STATES OF AMERICA, l Case No. 
Pl . "ff I d I 9912 azntz - ntervenor an ~ 
Cross-Appellant 
vs. 
LEGRANDE PETERSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND 
CROSS-APPELLANT 
STATE~IEXT OF XATURE OF CASE 
Respondent adopts the statement of the nature 
of the case set out by appellant. 
DISPOSITIOX IX LO,YER COURT 
Respondent adopts the statement of the appellant 
set out as the disposition in the lower court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON CROSS APPEAL 
The respondent and cross-appellant seeks to sus-
tain that part of the court's decision which was favorable 
to the relief sought and to have this court declare Sec-
tion 59-13-73 U.C.A. 1953 invalid and unconstitutional, 
for the reason that it is not uniform in application; 
that it has not repealed, by implication or otherwise, 
Section 59-2-2 U.C.A. 1953, which section grants special 
tax rates to those who deal with the State of Utah under 
a contract of sale which tax rates, in certain cases, are 
as great as twenty times less than those applied to the 
respondent and cross-appellant herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the reason that respondent cannot go along 
with the statement set out by the appellant, it will now 
set out its version of the statement of facts. 
Thiokol Chemical Corporation is a Delaware Cor-
poration, authorized to do business in the State of Utah, 
and was conducting said business for the year 1961. 
It came to Box Elder County because of the combined 
efforts of many people who were seeking new industries. 
It was in the year 1956 when it decided to locate in 
Box Elder County. At that time Thiokol purchased 
smne 11,000 acres of land and set up the plant facilities 
in the interest of furthering its private business. Some· 
time after it located here, it was able to obtain a con· 
tract for the production of the first stage of the Minute· 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
man and its operations immediately changed from a 
few hundred employees to the point where it now has 
approximately 6,000 employees. This situation has 
changed the very complexities of the economy of the 
northern part of Utah and has, at the same time brought 
a demand on the public for many increased facilities 
because of the increase in population by people moving 
iu, with their families, to take part in this new industrial 
revolution in our end of the state. 
The taxing authorities, who were very dormant at 
the time Thiokol 1noved into the State, immediately 
took on new energy and as a result, a special session 
of the Legislature in the year 1959 passed what is now 
known as Section 59-13-73 U.C.A., 1953, as amended, 
being a privilege tax upon the possession and use of 
exempt property. By the passing of the above section 
the Legislature aimed at picking up new revenue from 
new industries that had been attracted to Utah by eco-
nomic-minded people. It based such legislation on the 
l\'lichigan statute which had previously been passed by 
its legislature with the hope of obtaining revenue indi-
rectly from the Government of the United States, by 
taxing people who used the tax exempt property of the 
l"'nited States to further their work on some particular 
contract that they might have with it. The Utah Legis .. 
lature, while following the Michigan statute, further 
added to our statute, Section 59-13-73, U.C.A. 1953, 
as amended, certain exemptions which read: 
" . . . or where the possessor or user is a re-
ligious, educational or charitable organization or 
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the proceeds of such use or possession inure to 
the benefit of such religious, educational or chari-
table organization and not to the benefit of any 
other individual association or corporation ... " 
They also added a further provision as follows: 
" ... No tax shall be imposed upon the posses-
sion or other beneficial use of public lands occu-
pied under the terms of mineral or grazing leases 
or permits issued by the United States or the 
State of Utah or upon any easement unless the 
lease, permit or easement entitles the lessee or 
pennittee to exclusive possession of the premises 
to which the lease, per1nit or easement relates." 
These exemptions are in conflict with the exemptions of 
our Constitution, which are found in Article 13, Section 
2 and part of Section 3 of the same article. There was, 
at the time this law was passed, another section on our 
statutes which section is still the law and has been the 
law since statehood, being Section 59-2-2 U.C.A. 1953, 
which now reads as follows: 
"59-2-2. State Lands - Improvements taxable. 
- No tax shall be levied upon lands, the title to 
which remains in the state, held or occupied by 
any person under a contract of sale or lease from 
the state, but this provision shall not be construed 
to prevent the taxation of improvements on such 
lands and an interest therein to the extent of 
money paid, or due, in part payment of the pur· 
chase price thereof, whether an extension or pay· 
n1ent has been granted or not prior to the levy· 
ing of such tax. 'Vhere final payment has been 
made upon such lands, the contract of sale shall, 
for the purpose of taxation, be regarded as pass· 
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ing title to the purchaser or assignee, and the 
state land board shall immediately certify the 
receipt of such final payment to the state tax 
commission.'' 
It is followed hy Section 59-2-3 U.C.A. 1953, setting 
out a method of collecting the tax on this interest, which 
is as follows: 
"59-~-3. Collection of tax on interest of pur-
<.'haser - Certificate of sale - Effect of filed cer-
tificate. - Any tax levied on the interest of a 
purchaser of state lands before title passes to 
such purchaser or his assignee, shall be collected 
in the same manner as taxes on personal prop-
erty and the said interest shall be subject to sale 
for taxes in the same manner as personal prop-
erty. 
"Upon the sale of any such interest, the officer 
making such sale shall issue a certificate of sale, 
and such certificate or a certified copy thereof, 
upon being filed with the state land board, shall 
operate as an assignment of the interest of the 
original purchaser or his assignee in said con-
tract to the purchaser at the tax sale." 
There is also a provision of the statute which has also 
been on our books since statehood and is Section 59-5-50 
r.C.A. 1953. It was passed for the purpose of forward-
ing the equity of the purchaser in state lands sold under 
contract to the proper officials so they, in turn, could 
forward it to the respective county assessors. It reads 
as follows: 
"59-5-50. State lands - Land board to furnish 
lists. - On or before the 15th day of January of 
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each year the executive secretary of the state 
land board must make out and transmit to the 
state tax commission certified lists of lands sold 
by the state for which certificates of purchase 
or patents have been issued during the year pre-
ceding, giving a description thereof by divisions 
or subdivisions or lots and blocks, together with 
the names of the purchasers or patentees thereof, 
and in the case of lands sold by the state upon 
contract the amount of the purchase price and 
the total amount paid or due on January 1, pre-
ceding.'' 
The substance of the next section of our statute has 
been in existence since statehood and is still in existence 
as Section 59-5-51 U.C.A. 1953, and reads as follows: 
"59-5-51. Tax commission to furnish list of 
patented lands to county assessors. - The state 
tax commission shall furnish the several county 
assessors, annually, by February 1, a list of all 
patents of lands, except patents for mining lo-
cations, and all lands for which receivers' final 
receipts have been issued for which patents have 
not been issued, not previously reported, and a 
certified list of all lands that have been sold by 
·the state for which certificates of purchase or 
patents have been issued during the year preced· 
ing, giving a description thereof, together with 
the names of the purchasers or patentees. Such 
list shall also contain ·a description of the lands 
sold by the state during the preceding year upon 
contracts for purchase, together with the names 
and addresses of the purchasers where known, 
the amount of the purchase price and the total 
amount paid or due thereon on January 1, pre· 
ceding.'' 
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In the year 1961, Thiokol then had a contract with 
the United States for the production of the first stage 
of the ~linuteman. It had in its possession certain 
personal property belonging to the United States of 
America, which property was assessed to Thiokol, sepa-
rately und apart from other property which was owned 
outright hy Thiokol, under an assessment known as 
D!l75 and on said assessment was levied a tax equal 
to the sutn of $125,801.29 for said year. Said assessment 
was made pursuant to Section 59-13-73, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
Thiokol, in dealing with the United States under 
its contract (Exhibit #6) was working on a cost-plus 
a fixed fee basis ( Rec. 7 4) . This contract is not a cost-
plus a percentage of cost (Rec. 77). The fee is fixed 
during the stage of negotiations and before any con-
tract is awarded and particularly before any use of the 
property is made ( Rec. 88) . Near the top of page 13 
of Exhibit #6 it provides that the Government prop-
erty to be furnished to Thiokol shall be used "primarily" 
to carry out the contract (Rec. 79) (see dictionary defi-
nition for the word "primarily"). Mr. Boyce thought 
the word "exclusively" should have been used (Rec. 
79) but the testimony was to the effect (Rec. 73) that 
Thiokol could not use any of the Government property 
for non-government work. Also, that the Government, 
in order to detern1ine the cost, must approve certain 
policies of the company (Rec. 74, 75), all salary poli-
cies, job classifications, accounting policies, procure-
ment policies, organizational structures, etc. The Gov-
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ernment had the right to remove any or part of the 
personal property that might be sent to Thiokol to be 
used on its project at any time, to any other project, 
if it felt it might save some costs (Rec. 72) and this was 
provided for in the contract. 
Thiokol itself could not eliminate or reduce any 
costs which were reimbursable, by any use of the ma-
chinery, that is, whether the machinery was used for a 
part of the day or a full24 hours of the day, or whether 
it was picked up and shipped elsewhere (Rec. 90) they 
were still entitled to those costs expended to produce 
the end result. The fee Thiokol was to receive for the 
work would remain the same when the end result was 
accomplished, the saving by the use of the Government 
machinery which was furnished to Thiokol, was for the 
benefit of the Government. If no machinery owned by 
the Government was available, and one had to be ob-
tained, then, under the contract, the Government would 
authorize Thiokol to buy -it and title would go to the 
United States immediately upon purchase and Thiokol 
would be reimbursed. 
Thiokol itself is a corporation set up for the pur-
pose of making a profit ( Rec. 90, 246) but the use of 
this Government owned personal property by it, to 
carry out the contract, benefited the United States 
only, not Thiokol, in that it reduced the Government's 
costs. The United States was the only purchaser for 
the sale of the product being produced. Thiokol itself 
was not competing in any market, with any other firm 
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or corporation. It had one job to do and that was the 
first stage of the l\Iinuteman. The Government and 
Thiokol had agreed on the fee to be paid for the work 
in the production to be performed and in said agreement 
it had provided it would pay the cost, on top of the 
agreed fee. It also provided that the Government might 
save itself some costs by furnishing to Thiokol certain 
personal properties which it might have on inventory. 
Thiokol was bound to use the same if humanly possible. 
If the United States of America found it might benefH 
itself economically by moving the machinery after it 
had been shipped to Thiokol, to other places, it so re· 
served the right to transfer the machinery immediately. 
On November 29, 1961, Thiokol paid all of its taxes 
for which it was responsible, on its own privately owned 
lnnds, improvements and personal property. In addi-
tion thereto, Thiokol paid the sum of $125,801.29 for 
the assessment made under Section 59-13-73 Utah Code 
Annatated, 1953, and paid this last portion of the tax 
under protest ( Rec. 205) pursuant to directions from 
its contractor. United States of America. On May 21, 
1962, and within the period of limitations, Thiokol com-
menced this action ( Rec. 195) for a return of the money 
and the lTnited States, who had directed the suit be 
filed, intervened and challenged the constitutionality 
of the tax clai1n and claimed an interest in the litigation 
(Rec. :?14, 218). The Attorney General of the State 
of l'"tah entered under Section 78-33-11, U.C.A. 1953 . 
. A.t the trial of the issues before the First Judicial 
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District Court sitting without a jury, certain witnesses 
were brought before the court, one of which was Max 
Gardner, Director of the Utah State Land Board. He 
was shown Exhibit #3 (Rec. 53), which is a list of the 
lands sold on contract by the State Land Board; to 
the individuals or corporations, showing the equities of 
the purchasers thereon. He was also shown a list of 
re-sold land (Ex. 5) and (Rec. 54) and explained the 
difference to be that those listed on Exhibit #3 were, 
at the time of sale, lands that were still part of the 
public domain, while those listed on Exhibit # 5 were 
lands which had been acquired through mortgage fore-
closure, or default, and were not part of the public 
domain at the time title was obtained. He explained 
(Rec. 57) what Exhibit IA covered, being a special 
use lease to the Gilmer Lime Company, which had the 
following provision in it: 
"Lessee shall use the premises solely for the 
installation of facilities necessary, convenient, 
and incidental to the conduct of mining opera-
tions of lessee, including but not limited to spur 
tracks, storage, crushing, cleaning and treatment 
facilities, and shall not commit waste upon the 
premises." 
This lease of Gilmer Lime Company (Rec. 57) had 
a grazing lease thereon, being #I32I4 issued to J. W. 
Jordon of Heber, Utah, on the S.E. l)t of the section 
and on the S.W.lJ± was a grazing lease #LI3215 issued 
to L. W. Fitzgerald and Sons of Draper, Utah. He 
told about a sp~cial use lease #II (Rec. 64, 65) which 
contained this provision: 
10 
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"Lessee shall use the leased premises only for 
the purpose of constructing and operating there-
on an antique shop, a coffee shop," 
He told of leases, Exhibits 1G and 1H, (Rec. 65) and 
said they were not mineral or grazing leases and none 
of these leases referred to were assessed by any taxing 
authority on the State of Utah. 
~lr. ~lax H. Kerr, a director for the Property Tax 
Di,·ision of the State Tax Commission, claimed he had 
general supervision over county assessors (Rec. 97) 
and was produced as a witness for the defendant, who 
claimed they have to conduct annual assessors schools 
for instructions, which were generally held in December 
of each year ( Rec. 99) . He claimed he instructed the 
assessors in December of 1959, that the new privilege 
tax law had been passed and they would have to apply it 
(Rec. 99), but, for the purpose of showing that this 
officer, who had such supervisory powers, did not con-
sider it to apply to lands .sold on contract by the State 
of Utah, we quote the following from cross-examination 
(Rec. 105): 
"Q. 'Veil, I understood you to say that. I'm 
getting more specific. What instructions did 
you give with respect to this particular fac-
tual situation: ~Ir. "X" buys some land from 
the state under an installment contract. He 
makes some installment payments, but he 
receives no title to the property. The title 
remains in the state, but Mr. "X" is engaged 
in farn1ing and he farms this lands and he 
n1akes a handsome profit from the farming 
11 
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of this land. Is he taxed with respect to his 
use of the land under section 59-13-73? 
A. I do not recall such a hypothetical case ever 
coming to my attention to require an answer 
or a specific instruction. 
Q. Have you been aware of this litigation prior 
to today? 
A. This is my first day that I've been in court. 
Q. No, I'm not asking you that. We haven't 
tried this case .before today. Just started 
this rn.orning. Have you been aware of the 
pendency of this litigation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you had occasion to consider whether, 
in such circumstances as the hypothetical case 
which I give you a mmnent ago, whether the 
tax should or should not be assessed? 
A. I don't think that I have specifically con· 
sidered that hypothetical case before. This 
is something that's .. new. When we have a 
specific case presented to my division, we refer 
it to the legal division for specific advice." 
Again on page 107 of the Record we have: 
"Q. And do they in the course of complying with 
this requirement certify to you the equities 
in state lands that they are assessing? 
A. No, the counties do not certify that to the 
Tax Comn1ission. The Tax Cmnmission is 
required under the law to transmit to . t~e 
county, the. County Assessors, the eqmtles 
in state lands as furnished to the Tax Com· 
tnission by the State Land Board. 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. And has the State Tax Commission given 
thought to the need to assess these equities 
under section 59-13-73? 
.A. I don't remember any specific consideration 
that I was a party to by the Tax Commis-
sioners. referring to them as a commission, no. 
Q. Such instructions have never been issued? 
.A. So far as I know the only thing that has hap-
pened since the imposition of this law as 
regard to state land equities have been the 
same as before. We have been certifying 
them to the County Assessors in accordance 
with the law that requires us to. I don't know 
the citation. 
Q. 59-2-2? 
.A. If that is the one. That's the one we have been 
following. 
Q. In other words, there has been no change in 
the taxation of the interest which a contract 
vendee has in state lands since the advent of 
59-13-73? 
A. I can't answer that. I can only say that the 
equity information as to the purchase price, 
the purchaser, and the description of the land 
and the equity as of January first has been 
transmitted to the County Assessors in the 
same after that date as it was before ... " 
And on page 108, we have: 
"Q. Does the State Tax Commission have the 
authority to direct County Assessors to assess 
property which they have overlooked when 
it comes to the attention of the State Tax 
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Commission that the properties have been 
omitted from the tax rolls? 
A. It is my understanding that the Tax Com-
mission has the authority, after the Board of 
Equalization has met, to review the work of 
the County Assessors and to assess in its own 
name this property. 
Q. Any property that was omitted? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Has the State Tax Commission, in the exer· 
cise of that authority, ever made any assess· 
ments under section 59-13-73 for the year 
1961? 
A. Not to my knowledge." 
He was asked if there were investigations being made 
by the Tax Commission to determine if any property 
was escaping taxation under Title 59-13-73 (Rec. Ill) 
and he replied that there was a man in the field for 18 
months with specific assignment to investigate property 
escaping taxation. He admitted that this man had been 
in Box Elder County (Rec. Ill) but he could not 
recall anything being added to the rolls on account of 
this Section 59-13-73, and the court made a very in-
teresting comment at the close of his testimony (Rec. 
116): 
"THE COURT: Are you going to be here 
tomorrow, 1\'Ir. Kerr? The court is rather inter· 
ested in finding out what instructions were given 
the assessors "in 1959. 
l\1R. BOYCE: I think we have another wit· 
ness which will also corroborate that and go into 
more detail. 
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THE COURT: In other words, we're getting 
an issue now as to whether the state just used 
this as a fifth wheel to get taxes where they 
weren't otherwise assessed or whether you gave 
a blanket order that the act was to be enforced 
against everybody." 
~lr. John Rackman, another witness for the de-
fendant, stated he was director of the evaluation divi-
sion of the State Tax Commission (Rec. 118) and had 
the responsibility, under the provisions of 59-13-73, 
to make discovery and inform the county assessors of 
their duties (Rec. 120) and that he had a staff of 27 
people. He was asked a hypothetical question ( Rec. 
1~7) to the effect that if a man were buying a piece 
of property from the State on contract for $10,000.00 
and had paid $2,000.00 on an installment plan toward 
the purchase price, whether the land would be taxed on 
the basis of the $2,000.00 paid for the value of the land 
and he said, if the assessor were assessing under 59-2-2 
it would be on the $2,000.00. He was asked if the Tax 
Commission had issued any instructions if this land were 
being used for business for profit whether the assessment 
would be under 59-2-2 or under 59-13-73. After a con-
siderable amount of hedging, on page 128, and upon 
cross-examination, he was asked: 
"Q. I'm sure you do. And yet in your capacity 
and with all of the dedication that you bring 
to bear upon your job and the performance 
of your duties, you've never heard of any 
direction by the State Tax Commission to 
assessors to value land held under contract 
fron1 the state under 59-13-73 rather than 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
under 59-2-2 where the contract vendee is 
using that land in connection with a business 
operated for profit, have you? 
A. I haven't heard of it?" 
After further evasive answers on cross-examination, 
(Rec. 129) he was asked if he hadn't signed a letter 
dated December 26, 1962, with one Norman Johnson, 
one of the Assistant Attorney Generals, in regard to 
this very problem. He admitted he had done so and he 
was then asked (Rec. 129) bottom of the page: 
"Q. So that this question of whether state lands 
under contract, where the lands are being 
used by the contract vendee in connection 
with a business operated for profit, has been 
before you at least since November 27, and 
isn't it reasonable to assume that in your con· 
sideration of this problem you would have 
uncovered and would have been made aware 
of and would have found any directive that 
might have at any time up .~ntil today been 
issued by the State Tax Commission to Coun· 
ty Assessors as to what procedure to follow 
in such situations? 
A. Well, I don't know whether I'm supposed to 
testify as to my abilities as a research man 
or to the degree of research that I put into 
the particular problem, but I don't know of 
any directive that has been issued by the Tax 
Commission." 
lie was asked (Rec. 132) where title to the property 
is in the name of the State and an individual has con· 
tracted to buy this property in connection with a busi· 
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ness operated for profit, is that land taxed to the user, 
the one who has contracted to buy it from the State, 
under Section 59-13-73, or under Section 59-2-2, and 
his answer was 59-2-2. 
He was shown Exhibit #3 (Rec. 133) which was 
a list of the State owned lands being sold under con-
tract. l-Ie appeared to be perfectly familiar with it and 
said it was to indicate to the assessor that there is a 
property interest in a particular property that should 
be assessed. He was asked if these equities were still 
being sent out to the assessors in the same way now 
ns prior to the enactment of 59-13-73, and he answered: 
Yes. He was asked (Rec. 134) if there would be any 
other purpose for reporting the equities except to indi-
cate to the assessor on what the tax is to be based 
and his answer was, that it was still being sent for the 
sume reason it was sent in 1958. He came up with a 
new theory ( Rec. 135) and he was asked if there were 
any reason for sending out the equity listing, if Section 
59-13-73 is applicable and his answer was: 
"A. I've thought about that. It's possible, of 
course, that you would tax the equity under 
the basis or on the basis of 59-2-2 if that law 
were to remain upon the books, and possib~ 
the balance could be taxed on the basis of the 
privilege tax." 
On re-direct examination by J.\;lr. Boyce, Mr. Boyce 
readily fell in with this suggestion of Mr. Rackham. 
Then on page 136 he said: 
"Q. X ow could it not be possible, Mr. Rackham, 
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that some lands which the state sells to a par-
ticular individual may be taxable under 59· 
13-73 and that sum 1nay be taxable under 
59-2-2, depending on the use, the nature of 
their occupation, and things of that nature? 
A. \V ell, I would assume so." 
I have tried to set our very carefully the testimony 
of these two individuals who claim to be officers of the 
State of Utah and particularly the Tax Commission, 
charged with the responsibility of carrying out the en· 
forcement of the new privilege tax law, to show that 
they did not consider in the least degree that 59-2-2 had 
been repealed by any enactment of 59-13-73, either in 
their own mind or by any deed that they had done to 
so show their desire to have State lands assessed under 
59-13-73. 
Fred L. Petersen, the County Assessor of Box 
Elder County, was placed on the stand. He was shown 
Exhibit #8 (Rec. 140) and he advised us that he knew 
what it was and that it was the equities in state lands 
paid on the purchase price that pertained to Box Elder 
County. He admitted he had received it from the Tax 
Commission and had received one also for the year 1963. 
He showed certain figures on Exhibit #8 (Rec. 141) 
which he had applied to the equity which had been paid 
in by the purchaser, not to the value of the land but 
for the purpose of making the assessment. Again on 
(Rec. 142) and on (Rec. 144) he gave an account of 
how it was applied and taxed. He admitted (Rec. 158) 
that all land owned by the State of Utah and which 
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was purchased under contract was only assessed in Box 
Elder County for just the equity and that (Rec. 159) 
it was assessed in 1961 just as the same as it had been 
done in the past. He admitted he had made no investi-
gation of any property that might be owned by the 
county or the City or the Board of Education, which 
hus been leased to individuals (Rec. 160). He admitted 
(Rec. 177) that there was a gravel pit some people 
hy the name of Parson were buying from Brigham 
City and he even had correspondence with the State 
'l'ax Commission on it and yet it was not assessed for 
the year 1961 (Rec. 179). 
Exhibit #I, which was read into the record (Rec. 
2 to 6) was received and defendant's counsel (Rec. 6) 
said: 
"'Ve have no objections." 
This exhibit shows there were more than 380 contracts 
entered into with certain individuals for the sale of 
lands by the State of Utah. Exhibits 3 and 5 are a list 
of these lands and from an examination of them it was 
readily discernable that some of the contracts involve 
many hundreds of acres. 
It was the contention of the defendant that Section 
.59-13-73, being a privilege tax statute, had a provision 
in the fifth line thereof, which reads: 
" ... when such property is used in connection 
with a business conducted for profit ... " 
which should require the plaintiff to prove in his case, 
that in every instance of any piece of land that might 
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be owned by some entity such as the State, the Board 
of Education, Brigham City or Box Elder County, 
where the same was leased or being purchased, that 
the plaintiff would have to prove the use of the land 
was in connection with the business conducted for a 
profit. (See various refusals to so stipulate as to the 
use of the property for profit, Rec. 22, 23, 25, 27 and 
31, and the court's statement, Rec. 32). As a conse· 
quence, the parties attempted to resolve these diffi· 
culties by entering into certain stipulations they made 
into the record (Rec. 183-189), the substance of which 
was, that Walter G. Mann would prepare an affidavit 
as to the use of certain lands sold under contract by 
the State of Utah in Box Elder County, which were 
within his knowledge, as and for the year 1961. That 
Mr. Mark Crystal, an employee in the State Land 
Office, would prepare a statement regarding Exhibits 
IA through IX. Also that Mr. Crystal and Lee Young, 
employees of the State Land Board, would prepare 
affidavits as to the use of land purchased on contract 
from the State of Utah, as applied to the 380 different 
contracts which were listed and sent to the assessors 
and those affidavits would be received as exhibits as 
to the use made of the particular lands they describe 
in their affidavits. As to the balance, where any affidavit 
failed to set out and cover any particular contract of 
sale and show its used 1nade by the purchaser on the 
balance of the 380 contracts, that the court would say 
that the plaintiff has not sustained burden of proof in 
regard to those contracts not covered. In other words, 
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tht· mutter was before the court but that the plaintiff 
hasn't ofl'ered suft'icient proof as required by the court, 
as to any properties not covered by affidavits. These 
affidavits of the four parties were obtained. Affidavits 
on lund sold under contract by the State of Utah covered 
npproxiinately 200 contracts which set out that the 
purchaser was using the lands in a business conducted 
t'or profit. 
In summary, the evidence before the court showed 
n'ry plainly that the only party in Box Elder County, 
asst'Ss<'d under Section 59-13-73, was Thiokol Chemical 
Corporation, for the year 1961. Also, that no contract 
vendees fron1 the State of Utah, in Box Elder County, 
or the entire State of Utah, were assessed under the 
provisions of Section 59-13-73, but were, in fact, still 
assessed under 59-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
That no properties belonging to the Board of Educa-
tion of Box Elder County School District, of the City 
of Brighan1, or any other public body, were assessed 
under Section 59-13-73, where there was a leasing or 
a sale. That the State Tax Commission, or any other 
public body. or official, did not consider by their actions 
or practice that Section 59-13-73 was applicable to any 
contract or lease by the State of Utah; that Section 
,j!l-:?-:? was still in effect. That the Tax Commission 
' the County Assessors, and all other parties involved 
were still operating as fully under Section 59-2-2, 
C.C.A. 1953, for the year 1961, as they have been in any 
other year since statehood. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIOKOL CHEMICAL CORPORATION 
WAS NOT TAXABLE UNDER SECTION 59-
13-73 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953. THE 
SAME WAS IN CONFLICT WITH SECTION 
59-2-2 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AND 
W.A.S UNCONSTITUTIONAL, VOID AND OF 
NO EFFECT. 
Under the stipulation Ex. #1, Thiokol Chemical 
Corporation was assessed on 40lfo of its fair cash value 
as of January 1, 1961, and the equity of those purchas-
ing lands from the State of Utah was assessed on 407o 
on their equity of the purchase price paid in as of J anu-
ary 1, 1961. Let us give an illustration to show the 
difference between these two: Suppose that a piece of 
equipment which was owned by the United States had 
a fair cash value of $2,000.00 on January 1st, 1961, 
and suppose by the same token a person was buying 
from the State of Utah a piece of land on contract 
for $2,000.00 and had paid in the sum of $100.00. The 
equity of $100.00 as compared with the value of the 
other $2,000.00 is as much as 20 times difference. The 
assessor applies his percentage as set out by statute, 
which is 40lfo to the value on the one hand and the equity 
on the other (59-5-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953), the 
ratio of assessment is still the same, 20 times difference. 
Consequently it is a fact that cannot be disputed, Sec· 
tion 59-13-73 has imposed upon Thiokol Chemical Cor· 
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I. \'! .. 
poration and the Government of the United States a 
burdc11 that is many tin1es greater than it is putting 
on people dealing with the State of Utah under Sec-
tion .>~1-:!-:! of the U.C.A. 1953. If a lesser burden has 
btl'll imposed on users or purchasers of State owned 
land-. than on users of lands owned by the Federal Gov-
l'l'llllll'nt, is the assesstnent resulting therefrom uncon-
stitutional and void? 
"Section 59-5-l. Rate of assessment of prop-
c:rty: - .AJl taxable property must be assessed at 
forty percent of its reasonable fair cash value. 
Land anrl the itnprovements thereon must be 
separately assessed." 
"Art. XIII. Sec. 2. Tangible property to be 
taxed - Value ascertained - Properties exempt 
- Legislature to provide annual tax for state . 
. All tangible property in the state, not exempt 
under the laws of the United States, or under 
this constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to 
its ,·alue, to be ascertained as provided by law. 
The property of the state, counties, cities, towns, 
sehool districts, municipal corporations and pub-
lic libraries, lots tcith the buildings thereon used 
c.rclush.'clp for either religious worship or chari-
table purposes, and places of burial not held or 
used for private or corporate benefit, shall be 
c,l'empt for taxation ... ""(Emphasis added).. 
··section 3. Assessment and Taxation of tan-
gible property - Exen1ptions - Personal income 
tax - disposition of revenues. 
The Legislature shall provide by lRw a uni-
form and equal rate of assessment and taxation 
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on all tangible property in t~~ State, according 
to its value in money, and shall prescribe by law 
such regulations as shall secure a just valuation 
for taxation of such property, so that every per-
son and corporation shall pay a tax in propor· 
tion to the value of his, her or its tangible prop· 
erty, ... " 
The next question is: Has the State of Utah, 
through its Legislature, enacted by law a uniform and 
equal rate of assessment and t~xation of all tangible 
property in the state? Section 59-13-73 authorized an 
assessment upon the value of the property while Sec· 
tion 59-2-2 covering those people who are dealing with 
the State of Utah, authorizes an assessment based on 
the equity of the purchaser which may be as much as 
20 times lower. 
CASES 
Here are two interesting federal cases which I wish 
to analyze. The first is a case entitled Phillips Chemical 
vs. Dumas Independent School District, found in 361 
U.S., page 376, which is an appeal from the Supreme 
Court of Texas, decision given February 23, 1960. 
Under the laws of the State of Texas, and particularly 
Article 5248, of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 
as amended 1950, which had application to taxation of 
private users of property belonging to the United 
States, there was a certain assessment made against the 
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defendant. In addition to this particular article there 
was also Article 7173, which governs the taxation of 
private lessees of real property owned by the state and 
its political subdivisions. It did not authorize taxation 
of a lessee under a lease subject to termination at the 
lessor's option in the event of sale. This Article #7173 
is set out in part on page 379, and reads as follows: 
"Property held under a lease for a term of 
three years or n1ore, or held under a contract 
for the purchase thereof, belonging to this state, 
or that is exempt by law from taxation in the 
hands of the owner thereof, shall be considered 
for all the purposes of taxation, as the property 
of the person so holding the same, except as 
otherwise specifically provided by law." 
The other section, being Article 5248 and set out in part 
on page 378, and provides as follows: 
''Provided further, that any portion of said 
land and improvements, which is used and occu-
pied by any person, firm, association of persons 
or corporation, in its private capacity, or which 
is being used or occupied in the conduct of any 
private business or enterprise, shall be subject 
to taxation by this state and its political subdi-
visions." 
This last provision was added to the old law of Texas 
and was intended to levy a tax upon the use of Govern-
ment land held and occupied by tenants for profit. 
There is another interesting sidelight in this case and 
that is, that Phillips Chemical Company engages in a 
commercial n1anufacture of ammonia on valuable in-
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dustrial property .leased fro~ the Federal Government 
in Moore County, Texas. The lease, executed in 1948, 
pursuant to the Military Leasing Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 
77 4, is for a primary term of 15 years and calls for an 
annual rental of over $1,000,000.00. However, it re· 
serves to the Governn1ent the right to terminate upon 30 
days' notice in the event of a national emergency and 
up on 90 days' notice in the event of a sales of the 
property. Consequently in this case, the state of Texas 
could, if it had chosen, said this property was not sub-
ject to taxation as provided for under Article 7173 
for the reason that the term was for a period of less 
than three years, inasmuch as it could be terminated 
on 30 days' notice under a national emergency, but 
rather than do this they chose to assess it under Article 
5248, which provided that the entire lease was subject 
to an assessment. Stating it another way, they have 
two statutes which were in conflict. We have a notation 
found on page 380, which reads as follows: 
"As construed by the Texas Courts, Article 
7173 is less burdensome than Article 5248 in 
three respects. First, the measure of a tax under 
Article 7173 is not the full value of leased tax· 
exempt premises, as it apparently is under Arti· 
cle 5248 but only the price the taxable leasehold 
would bring at a fair voluntary sale for cash:-
the value of the leasehold itself. Second, by Its 
very terms Article 7173 imposes no tax on a 
lessee whose lease is for a term of less than three 
years. Finally, and crucially here, a leas~ ~or 
three years or longer but subject-like P~11lhps 
- to termination at the lessor's option m the 
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event of a sale is not "a lease for a term of three 
vears or more" for the purpose of Article 7173. 
;rrammell vs. Faught, 74 Texas 557, 12 S.,V. 
317. Therefore because of the termination pro-
visions in its lease, Phillips could not be taxed 
under Article 7173. 
"Although .Article 7173 is, in terms, applicable 
to all lessees who hold tax-exempt property under 
a lease for a term of three years or 1nore, it ap~ 
pears that only lessees of public property fall 
within this class in Texas. Tax . exemptions for 
real property owned by private organizations 
-charities, churches and similar entities-do not 
survive a lease to a business lessee. The full value 
of the leased property becomes taxable to the 
owner and the lessee's indirect burden conse-
quently is as heavy as a burden imposed directly 
on federal lessees under Article 5248. Under 
these circumstances, there appears to be no dis-
crimination between the Government's lessees 
and lessees of private property. 
"However, all lessees of exempt public lands 
would appear to belong to the class defined by 
Article 7173. In view of the fact that lessees in 
this class are taxed because they use exempt prop-
erty for a non-exempt purpose, they appear to be 
similarly situate and presumably should be taxed 
alike. Yet by the amendment of Article 5248, 
the Texas Legislature segregated federal lessees 
and imposed on them a heavier tax burden than 
is imposed upon the other members of the class 
under Article 7173. In this case the resulting 
difference in tax, .attendant upon the identity of 
Phillip's lessor, is extreme; the state and the 
school district concede that Phillips would not be 
taxed at all if its lessor were the state or one of 
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its political subdivisions instead of the Federal 
Government. The discrimination against the 
United States and its lessees seems apparent. 
The question, however, is whether it can be jus· 
tified." 
This case was decided on February 23, 1960, and is a 
very recent case on the subject matter and the case 
goes into all of the other opinions rendered on the sub· 
ject matter and shows the difference in their application 
and then it says, on page 387: 
"None of these arguments, urged in support 
of the Texas classification, seem adequate to jus· 
tify what appears to be so substantial and trans· 
parent a discrimination against the Government 
and its lessees. Here, Phillips is tax~d under 
Article 5248 on the full value of the real property 
which it leases from the Federal Government, 
while businesses with similar leases, using exempt 
property owned by the state and its political 
subdivisions, are not taxed on their leaseholds at 
all. The differences between the two classes, 
at least when the Government's interests are 
weighed in the balance, seems too impalpable to 
warrant such a gross differentiation. It follows 
that Article 5248, as applied in this case, dis· 
criminates unconstitutionally against the United 
States and its lessees. As we had occasion to 
state quite recei1tly, it still remains true, as it has 
from the time of McCullough vs. lVIaryland 43 
Wheat, 316, that a state tax may not discrimi· 
nate against the Government or those with whom 
it deals. 3 US vs. City of Detroit, supra, at 4i3. 
Therefore, this tax may not be exacted. Re· i 
versed. 
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Another case, 1\Ioses Lake Homes vs. Grant County, 
365 U.S. 744, I believe is in point. It came about when 
the statutes of the State of Washington provided for 
methods of assessment on Government leased property 
at a much higher value and consequently at a much 
higher tax than other taxable property. The code pro-
vided for an assessment of 50Cf'o of its fair market value 
on other property, while it provided that "taxable lease-
hold estate shall be valued at such price as they would 
bring at a fair, voluntary sale for cash." (Page 749). 
The court, on page 7 51, said: 
"If anything is settled in the law, it is that a 
state may not discriminate against the Federal 
Government, or its lessees. See e.g. Phillips Co. 
vs. Dumas School District, 361 U.S. 376; United 
States vs. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 473; 
City of Detroit vs. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489. 
In United States vs. City of Detroit, supra, we 
said: 'It still remains true, as it has from the be-
ginning, that a tax may be invalid even though 
it does not fall directly on the United States if 
it operates so as to discriminate against the Gov-
ernment of those with whom it deals'. 355 U.S. 
at 473. 
"The Dumas Case, supra, is closely in point 
and controlling. There the state of Texas taxed 
the leasehold estate of a government lessee at 
the 'full value of the leased premises' (361 U.S. 
at 378}, while it imposed a 'distinctly lesser bur-
den on sin:tilarly situated lessees of exempt 
property owned. by the State and its political 
subdivisions.' 361 U.S. at 379. We there said, 
'It does not seem too much to require that the 
State treat those who deal with the Government 
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as well as it treats those with whom it deals it-
self.' 361 U.S. at 385, and we held the tax to be 
void because it 'discriminates unconstitutionally 
against the United States and its lessees.' 361 
U.S. at 379. That case is indistinguishable from 
this one on the point here. 
"The Court of appeals was also in error in 
holding that 'the fact that the taxes are higher 
does not invalidate the entire tax (but) only 
requires that the amount collectible be reduced 
to what it would have been if the tax had been 
levied on a non-Wherry Act leasehold basis' 
(276 F2d, at 847) and in remanding the case 
to the District Court to make the necessary 
adjustment. We held in the Dumas case, supra, 
that a discriminatory tax is void and 'may not 
be exacted', 361 U.S. at 387. The effect of court's 
remand was to direct the District Court to de-
cree a valid tax for the invalid one which the 
State had attempted to exact. The District 
Court has no power so to decree. Federal courts 
may not assess or levy taxes. Only the appro-
priate taxing officials of Grant County may 
assess and levy taxes on these leaseholds, and 
the federal courts may determine, within their 
jurisdiction, only whether the tax levied by those 
offiicals is or is not a valid one. When, as here, 
the tax is invalid, it 'may not be exacted.' Phillips 
Co. vs. Dumas School District, 361 U.S. at 387." 
The court, in concluding its remarks on this case, said 
on page 752: 
"Inasmuch as the taxes, presently assessed ~nd 
levied, discriminate unconstitutionally aga1~st 
the United States and its lessees, they are vmd, 
and hence 1nay not be exacted. REVERSED." 
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POINT IB 
TliiOKOL DID XOT 1-IA\~E THE BENE-
Fll'L\L USE REQUISITE FOR TAXATION 
l' ~ D~~H s l~:cTI 0~ 59-1:3-73. 
Plaintiff's do not dispute that under certain circum-
stances the use of Government property may be taxed 
to the user, rather, they contend that such circumstances 
did not exist here, and, if construed to be applicable 
under the facts here present, Section 59-13-73 is un-
constitutional. 
In United States and duPont vs. Livingston, 179 
F. Supp. 9, aff'd without opinion 364 U.S. 281, the 
South Carolina Tax Commission "contend ( ed) that 
duPont had a separable beneficial and taxable use of 
(Government property) for their use was necessary 
to duPont's performance of its contractual obligations" 
with the Government. (179 F.Supp. 9, 22). In rejecting 
that contention, the Court said (179 F.Supp. 9, 23): 
"For the possessor of. government property to 
have a separable taxable use measured by the 
,·alue of the Government property much more is 
required than would be provided by complete 
acceptance of the Tax Commission's hypothesis. 
··The custodian of a federal post office build. 
ing is paid for the performance of his duties, 
but his use of the materials he requires in the 
perforn1ance of his housekeeping duties is so 
completely that of the United States that no one 
would think of taxing him upon the value of the 
materials. In each of the Detroit cases, the Su-
preme Court was concerned with taxation of a 
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completely separate business enterprise which 
used government property for its purposes of 
profit and which derived as much advantage from 
the use as if it had legal title to the property. 
No such condition is to be found here. The use 
of the Savannah River Plant and of goods and 
materials purchased for its operation is so com-
pletely that of the United States, that while one 
may concede the possibility of advantage to 
others, those others do not become subject to 
taxation upon the value of the plant or its pur· 
chases when, by contract, and in good conscience 
without a contract, the United States must pay 
any tax enacted." 
Like duPont, Thiokol did not pay any rent or other 
charge for the use of any of the property, nor did it 
use any of the property for any purpose other than the 
fulfillment of its contracts with the Government. i\iore· 
over, it held and used the property only at the will of 
the Government, which had the absolute right to remove 
any of the property at any time, if its interests would 
be served thereby. Thus, like duPont, Thiokol was 
nothing more than a bailee for the Government's benefit. 
Unlike the contractors in the Detroit cases referred 
to in Livingston, supra, Thiokol was not engaged in 
merely manufacturing required items according to Gov· 
ernment specifications. Rather, like duPont, Thiokol 
was engaged in developing and testing. 
Just as duPont, in Livington, was the alter ego 
through which the Atomic Energy Commission dis· 
charged its duty of furthering, by research and de· 
velopment, the production of fissionable materials, so 
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here. Thiokol Inay be considered the alter ego through 
which the Air Force Department discharged its duty 
or furthering the Government's missile program. 
In sustaining the taxes in the Detroit cases, the 
Supreme Court found that one contractor was "using 
tax-exempt property for its own 'beneficial personal 
use' and 'advantage' " {355 U.S. 466, 472); that 
another was "free within broad limits to use the prop-
erty as it thought advantageous and convenient in per-
1 Corming its contracts and maximizing its profits from 
them" (355 U.S. 484, 486); and that the third was 
I "using or processing (Government property) in the 
1 course of its own business" {355 U.S. 489, 493). Since 
, no such findings are warranted here, Thiokol did not 
. have the separable taxable use necessary to constitu-
tionally sustain a tax under Section 59-13-73. 
It is not only to avoid an unconstitutional construe-
·. tion of Section 59-13-73 that it must be held that Thio-
kol lacked the beneficial use requisite for taxation, 
thereunder. Here, as in 1\tlichigan, the Legislature 
apparently was trying to equate the tax burden im-
posed on private enterprise using exempt property 
with that carried by similar businesses using taxed 
property. In the absence of such equalization the lessees 
of tax-exempt property might well be given a distinct 
. economic preference over their neighboring competitors 
1 
Such consideration, however, does not obtain here. 
Because of the very nature of the program in which it 
,is engaged-development of missiles for the Govern-
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ment-there cannot possibly be any neighboring com-
petitors over whom Thiokol can gain any advantage 
by reason of its use of the property. 
In sum, neither the purpose nor language of Sec-
tion 59-13-73 require that Thiokol's use be held taxable 
hereunder; and to avoid any question of its constitu-
tionality Section 59-13-73 should be construed to be 
inapplicable to Thiokol's use of the property. here in-
volved. Moreover, if construed to be applicable here, 
the tax provideu for by Section 59-13-73 is unconsti-
tutional not only because it is tantamount to a tax on 
the Government's property and activities (United 
States and duPont vs. Livingston, supra; see also 
United States v. Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174) but also 
because it discriminates against the Government and 
those with whom it deals. 
POINT II 
THE SUBJECT'S ASSESSMENTS DO IX· 
FRINGE UP 0 N FEDERAL IMMUNITY 
FRO~I STATE TAXATION, and, 
POINT III 
SECTION 59-13-73 UTAH CODE ANNO· 
TATED, 1953, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS 
BEING IN VIOLATION OF BOTH THE FED· • 
ERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTION. 
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I fed that Points II and II are so closely related 
that they can be covered together in the following argu-
ment. 
As pointed out in Phillips Chemical vs. Dumas 
Independent School District, 361 U.S. page 376, and 
particularly the last paragraph found on page 387: 
"As we had occasion to state, quite recently, 
it still remains true, as it has from the time of 
~lcCullough vs. Maryland, 43 Wheat, 316, that 
·a state tax may not discriminate against the Gov-
ernment or those with whom it deals. 3 U.S. 
vs. City of Detroit, supra, 473. Therefore, this 
tax may not be exacted. Reversed." 
Also, as pointed out in Moses Lake Homes vs. Grant 
County, 365 U.S. 7 44, where quoted from page 751: 
"If anything is settled in the law, it is that a 
state may not discriminate against the Federal 
Government, or its lessees ... It still remains 
true, as it has from the beginning, that a tax 
may be invalid even though it does not fall di-
rectly on the United States if it operates so as 
to discriminate against the Government, or those 
with whom it deals .... It does not seem too 
much to l'equire that the state treat those who 
deal with the government as well as it treats 
those with whom it deals itself .... And we held 
the tax to be void because it discriminates un-
constitutionally against the United States and 
its lessee." 
.The U.S. Court having held that discrimination cannot 
-:take place. let us examine closely the wording of Sec-
·.)ion 59-13-73 as compared to the limitations placed 
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upon it by the State Constitution, to see if discrimina-
tion has taken place. Article 13, Section 2, begins as 
follows: 
"Tangible property to be taxed - Value as-
certained - Properties exempt - Legislature to 
provide annual tax for state: - All tangible 
property in the state, not exempt under the laws 
of the United States, or under this constitution, 
shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be 
ascertained as provided by law. The property 
of the state, counties, cities, towns, school dis-
tricts, municipal corporations and public libra· 
ries, lots with the buildings thereon used exclu-
sively for either religious worship or charitable 
purposes, and places of burial not held or used 
for private or corporate benefit, shall be exempt 
from taxation . .. n (Emphasis added). 
In other words, the Constitution prescribes the exemp· 
tion that shall be given to either religious or charitable 
organizations, and limited it to lots with buildings 
thereon. Let us compare that with our Section 59-13-73, 
which reads: 
"Section 59-13-73: Privilege tax upon pos· 
session and use of tax-exempt property - Ex· 
ceptions: - From and after the effective date 
of this act there is imposed and there shall be 
collected a tax upon the possession or other 
beneficial use enjoyed by any private individual, 
association, or corporation of any property, real 
or personal, which for any reason is exempt from 
taxation, when such property is used in connec· 
tion with a business conducted for profit, except 
where the use is by way of a concession in ~r 
relative to the use of a public airport, park, fa1r· 1 
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ground, or similar property which is available 
us u mutter of right to the use of the general 
public, or where the possessor or user is a re-
ligious, educational or charitable organization or 
the proceeds of sztch 'USe or possession in,ure to 
the benefit of such religi01ts, educational or chari-
table organization and not to the benefit of any 
other indiridztal association or corporation ... '' 
(Emphasis added). 
Let us use several examples and see how this can be 
ridiculously applied. Any church, charity or school 
could lease from the State of Utah or from the Gov-
, ernment. buildings, lands or personal property and 
1
enter into a competitive business at any place within 
the State of Utah and so long as they were the users, 
or the profits derived therefrom, were used for the bene-
~fit of either of these three organizations there would be 
. .no tax applied, or, if Thiokol were -developing or test-
-ing x-ray ma~hines or other equipment for a charitable 
'~hospital, and using property owned by the charity in 
performing its service contract, it would not be subject 
Jnder Section 59-13-73, nor would it be subject thereto 
:r, in executing a commission to design and fabricate 
!~ligious objects for a church, it used as models for the 
.. ncorporation into the new work, objects or precious 
netals loaned and furni~hed by the church. Nor would 
rhiokol be taxed under Section 59-13-73 for the use 
t would necessarily make of an educational institution's 
a,roperty in performing a contract or redesigning an 
.xisting laboratory computor or other facilities or 
~quipment owned by the institution. Thus Section 59-
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13-73 gives more favored treatment to religious, chari· 
table and educational institutions than to the Govern· 
ment, and contrary to its State Constitution. 
Or, if any of these three organizations would lease 
from the United States or the State of Utah, ware· 
houses and then sublease them at a handsome profit to 
private individuals to use in a competitive business 
so long as they used the profit to benefit the charity, 
the church or the school, they would not be taxed. Yet, 
the Constitution has specifically limited the exemption 
to be given to charitable and religious organizations, 
to lots with buildings thereon, used for either religious 
or charitable purpose. This court has held, in Parker 
et al vs. Quinn, 64 P. 461, where Section 3 of Article 
13 of the Constitution was discussed, that only that 
portion of the property of a benevolent society which 
is occupied and used exclusively for charitable pur· 
poses, is exempt from taxation, and the exemption 
does not extend to that portion not appropriated by 
the society to its own use, but held as a source of reve· 
nue. But Section 59-13-73 defies, and is in direct 
opposition to, such a holding and is an exemption 
greater than the Constitution which limits it. This 
court again, in 177 P.214, Odd Fellows Building Asso· 
ciation vs. Naylor, where again it discussed our Con· 
stitution, Article 13, Section 3, held that where a build· 
ing owned by a charitable association was, in part, 
rented out to stores, the incmne being used only to keep 
the building in repair and the remainder income for 
charitable and benevolent purposes, the part of the 
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building rented out to the stores was not exempt from 
taxation under Constitution Article 13, Section 3. Yet 
again, this new provision of the statute would defy it 
und allow that organization to do indirectly what it 
could not do directly by previous interpretations by this 
.court. Let us take one more example. Suppose that 
either of the three organizations should buy from the 
State Land Board on a 20 year contract, some very 
xaluable farm land that had been foreclosed by the State 
:or Utah, and proceed to farm the land and use the pro-
'ceecis for its benefit. Now, I have this question: Is the I 
'equity of the purchaser of this land taxable under 59-
l .. 
2·21 Is its value taxable under 59-13-73, or is it exempt 
·lJnder 59-13-73 ~ At the end of the contractual period 
I ~~d when this land is paid for and title is transferred, 
'sit taxable 1 In the latter case I believe we would have 
':o say yes, so long as Parker et al vs. Quinn and Odd 
Fellows Building Association vs. Naylor, supra, were 
\till the law. Then the further question, if there is any 
' ,!Xemption at all, is the act discriminatory in that it does 
·aot treat the United States and the parties with whom 
t deals, on equal basis? 
POINT IV 
, THERE IS A DISCRI~IINATION IN AP-
·,LICATON OF 59-13-73 U.C.A. 1953, ON ITS 
'ACE, BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES 
.~D THOSE 'VITH WHOM IT DEALS IS 
::TOT TREATED EQUALLY WITH OTHER 
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ENTITIES, AND 59-13-73 U.C.A. 1953, DOES 
NOT REPEAL 59-2-2 U.C.A. 1953, AND SAID 
SECTION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
FORMER. 
When the court rendered its opinion (Rec. 196) 
it said: 
" ... the court has been deeply impressed with 
the fact that the so-called Detroit and the Mus-
. kegon cases from Michigan had with them in 
the record which went to Washington a privilege 
tax which had an exception in it. It's true that 
the people who apparently lifted that statute 
from Michigan and brought it out here and intro· 
duced it into our Legislature added some more 
wrinkles in it. They have put something about 
charitable use or where the proceeds of the use 
would be for charity, so that out here in Utah 
the Michigan statute, which was before the high· 
est court in the land in those two cases, has an 
additional exception. That is the exception for 
charitable uses or where the proceeds are to be 
used for charitable purposes." 
The court further said (Rec. 198) as follows: 
" ... Charities and religions were known to 
this country from the time of its inception. Ch~ri· 
ties and religions were Ln existence at the ti!Ue i 
of the Civil 'Var and this court's understandmg 
of the hornbook principles of law do not dictate 
that because an eleemosynary corporation such 
as operates these so-called church farms is not 
taxed, or because religious edifices are not tax~d, 
or because other charitable organizations whicp 
operate as true charities are not taxed, tha~ IS 
not persuasive to this court -and I apprec1att 
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this is merely the court of first instance-that the 
act is unconstitutional . . . " 
It appears to the writer that the judge missed the 
point, which is, that the Legislature cannot give or make 
greater exemptions than that allowed by the Consti-
tution of the State of Utah. The Constitution as pointed 
out under Points II and III, limits the exemptions. 
lt is not a question of someone's individual feeling 
that as a matter of principle they ought to be exempt 
: (~In lad Second Ward of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
:Latter-day Saints vs. State Tax Commission, 269 P2d 
.1077), as expressed by that court, but is a question of 
:what the limitations on exemption is. Our Legislature 
enacted into the statute exemptions which are in excess 
of the Constitution and contrary to cases that have been 
1
adjudicated by this court, more particularly set out in 
Points II and III. ~Ir. Boyce argues in his brief, page 
36, that the Phillips Chemical Company vs. Dumas 
School District, 361 U.S. 376, provided a different tax 
rate on lessees of state land from those of the Federal 
:;overnment. As I read the case, they did not provide 
1 different tax rate, but provided a different method 
lf arriving at the value of the property before 
he tax was applied. Article 7173 provided that the 
axable leasehold would be the price it would bring at 
1 fair Yoluntary sale for cash, while Article 5248 pro-
'ided for the full value. Article 7173 imposed no tax 
\-here the lease is for a term of less than three years, 
.pplying this to our statutes. Section 59-13-7 4 pro-
ides that the values would be the same as if the pos-
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sessor or user was , the owner thereof as determined 
in the ad valorem assessment, while our Section 59·2·2 
provides that the values would be only the equity of , 
the purchaser. By analogy the same state of facts took 
place in Phillips Chemical Company vs. Dumas School 
District, 361 U.S. 376. They had two different values 
to apply the tax rate to, as we have in our instance, 
that is, that leases of individuals with the State of Utah 
were and are and have been taxed on just the equity. 
while leases of Government property, since the advent 
of 59-13-73 are taxed at the same ad valorem value as 
other property. 
We feel that the trial judge erred when he found 
that 59-2-2 had been impliedly repealed by Section 
59-13-73, to the degree that the latter statute was in· 
consistent with the for~mer. In 3 Sutherland Statutory 
Construction, 3rd Edition, Section 6709, we find: 
"One of the most significant aids of construe· 
tion in determining the meaning of revenue laws 
is the administrative interpretation given such 
acts by the agency that is responsible for its ad· 
ministration and enforcement." 
The Utah Suupreme Court, E. C. Olsen Company vs. 
State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563, 168 P2d 324,said 
on page 332, left-hand column: 
" . . . a practical construction of the s~atu~ 
shown to ha Ye been the accepted construction o. 
the agency charged with administering the mat 
ters in question under the statute will be one f~c 
tor which the court may take into consideratior 
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as persuasive as to the mea~ing of the statut.e. 
J4:specially is this true where the ~gency, as In 
this ca~e. is one on whom the Legislature must 
relr to advise it as to the practical working out 
of the statute and where practical application of 
the statute presents the agency with unique op-
portunities and experiences for discovering de-
ficiencies, inaccuracies or improvements in the 
statute .... " 
~ow, compare that with what is happening in this 
particular situation. The State Land Board certifies 
the list of all state contracts to the Tax Commission. 
fhe Tax Comtnission certifies them to the assessors so 
hat the assessors can assess the property under Section 
59·2·2. The assessors of every county, according to our 
1tipulation throughout the State of Utah, assessed the 
>roperty being sold on contract by the State Land 
1Jnnrd in the same manner in 1961 as it had in all pre-
·ious years. The individuals in the Tax Commission 
vho I have quoted so freely in my statement of facts, 
~lr. Kerr and ~Ir. Rackham, who, with other employees, 
$ere searching for property that might be escaping 
faxntion, never once considered that Section 59-2-2 
ad been repealed or had even been affected by the 
nactment of Section 59-13-73. The only time such a 
nought ever came up was in the course of the trial 
~hen someone suggested that maybe a person could be 
Jbject to two assessments, one under 59-2-2 and 
,ther for the balance under · 59-13-73. From then on 
' ' 
,·e hear lots of arguments that Section 59-13-73 had 
·npliedly repealed 59-2-2 to the degree that 59-2-2 
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was inconsistent with the former. The defendant, j~ 
his brief, contends that not all purchasers who might 
buy lands from the State of Utah would be subject 
to a tax under 59-13-73. That you have to find out 
first whether the possessor or purchaser was using or 
possessing the lands in conjunction with the business 
conducted for profit. He even argues that if a party 
should buy from the State of Utah on contract, a piece 
of land, and just let the land sit idle, that nothing but 
his equity should be assessed under 59-2-2, while 
if another person bought a piece of land of equal s~e 
and dimension from the state on contract and had any 
benefit regardless as to how great or how small, that 
the party should then be assessed under 59-13-73. All 
I can say is, what a confusing law, or interpretation 
of a set of laws this can turn out to be. I do not believe 
for one minute that any person would buy a piece of 
land unless he believes there is a profit in the venture. 
If he allows it to remain idle, he believes he will benefit 
by appreciation in value more than he would benefit 
from the interest he would make on the investment 
if he left it in a banking account or invested it in other 
properties. I do not believe for one minute that the 
Legislature ever considered such a wild interpretation. 
I do believe that when they passed Section 59-13·73 
they never gave a second thought to Section 59·2·2. 
The Legislature was after revenue from people dealing 
with the Federal Government's property and were not 
concerned at all with the people dealing with the State 
of Utah on contract. This theory of Section 59-13·73 
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mpliedly repealing any part of 59-2-2 which might 
·,Je inconsistent with it, is now being widely proclaimed 
,y people who were the advisors of the Tax Commis-
aion and the Tax Con1mission was also the advisor of 
he numberous County Assessors, who, until the law 
1vus qm'stioncd, went along and administered Section 
i9-:!-:! in the same manner as it had always been ad-
'ninistered since statehood. 
The writer will agree with the statement of counsel 
,or the defendant that it may be generally conceded 
hat repeal by implication is not favored. Sutherland, 
)tatutorY Construction, 3rd Ed., Section 2014, where 
.~ is quoted: 
"The presun1ption against implied repeal is 
overcome, however, hy showing thatthe two acts 
are irreconcilable, clearlr repugnant as to vital 
matters to which they relate and so inconsistent 
that the two cannot have concurrent operation." 
'hese two sections are irreconcilable. Section 59-13-73 
roYides that the tax under this section applies to: 
" ... real or personal property which, for any 
reason, is c,rcmpt from taxation., when such prop-
erty is used in connection was a business con-
du~ted for profit .... " (Emphasis added). 
and sold under contract by the State of Utah was 
>t exempt from taxation because ever since statehood 
tere have been provisions of the statutes, which have 
quired the equity of the purchaser to be assessed 
1d statutes were enacted, which are numerous, being 
·~tion 5g-2-2. Section 59-2-3, Section 59-5-50 and 
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59-5-51, which provide ways and means to carry out 
the mandate of the legislative body. When Section 
59-13-73 was passed in 1959, the Legislature, by the 
very wording of the statute, intended to cover land that 
was tax exempt, not land that was then being taxed. 
As a consequence we had two statutes on the books, 
one which was very favorable to purchasers who were 
purchasing land from the State of Utah and one which 
was more burdensome by comparison to individuals 
who were leasing land from the Federal Government. 
These two sections are just like the two sections referred 
to in the Phillips Chemical Company vs. Dumas School 
District, 361 U.S. 376, both in existence and both being 
administered, but the burden is unequal. The defendant 
argues on page 45 of his brief that Section 59-13·77 
U.C.A. 1953, which contains the following provision: 
"Nothing contained herewith shall be con· 
strued as limiting or repealing the exemptions 
granted in sections 59-2-4, 59-2-5, 59-2-6, 59·2·7, 
59-2-8, 59-2-9, 59-2-12 and 59-2-13 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953." 
would demonstrate a legislative intent that the pro· 
visions of the privilege tax act would limit or repeal 
the exemptions of Section 59-2-2 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, to the degree of any inconsistency. Let us just 
review what those exemptions in these sections cover: 
Section 59-2-4 covers property in interstate. commerce;~ 
Section 59-2-5 covers property owned by disabled vet· 
erans or their unmarried widows or minor orphans; 
Section 59-2-6 is application, proof and percentage 
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(lisubility, minimum allowed and has reference back 
59-~-5; Section 59-t-7 covers pumping plant for 
rigation; Section 59-2-8 is computation of power used 
,r irrigation; Section 59-2-9 is exemption to be pro-
& ted and paid to users and has reference back to 59-
·K; Srd:ion 59-2-lt has reference to exemption of 
loperty owned by blind persons or their unmarried 
idows or minor orphans, Amount; Section 59-2-13 
rocedure and conditions, filing of application and 
atcment as to vision, maximum corrected vision al-
',wed, and has reference back to Section 59-2-12. Each 
;e of these sections is a specific exemption, that is 
'rotected and has nothing to do with a statement of 
\"xying a tax but is a statement of relieving a tax by 
t'orm of exemption. Section 59-2-2 is the imposition 
· a tax and it is followed by 59-2-3 for a method of 
ltforcing the collection of that tax levy. To this writer 
would appear that the legislative intention was to 
~otect the exemptions only, but the statute that im-
'sed the tax, to-wit: 59-2-2 was intended to remain 
existence and had they wanted it repealed, they could 
L¥e added a section so declaring the repeal of Section 
·•-2-:2. which has nothing to· do with exemptions. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COLTRT DID NOT ERR IN 
IXDIXG THAT THERE HAD BEEN SUCH 
DISCRI)IIXATOR1"'" APPLICATION OF 
1
-la-;a t'"TAH CODE AXXOTATED, 1953, AS 
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TO A 'rOID THE ASSESSMENT AND TAX 
AND THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THl 
RELIEF IT GRANTED. 
The entire brief, in practically every point tha: 
has been raised,_ has gone into the problem of discrimi· 
natory application, so that the writer will not burde~ 
this court further by repeating, but alleges that thf 
first part of this point has been fully covered. In regard 
to the second part, the defendant in his argument 
alleges that the State court, or even this court, if it 
found that discrimination in the application of the tax 
existed, and if he could convince you that it was not 
statutory discrimination, then it would be your duty 
to direct only part of the tax money be restored and 
not all of it. Let's just take this argument and tear 
it apart and see just what he is saying. If I understand 
him correctly, he is saying that the only discrimination 
that can exist is between the amount of tax that some 
people might be required to pay under 59-2-2 when 
their equity is assessed as compared with Thiokol's 
tax when the full value is assessed. The formula for each 
is as follows: Equity times 407o times tax rate for those 
under 59-2-2 and for Thiokol it is value times 40% 
times tax rate and he is, in fact, saying that you should 
apply this for1nula of 59-2-2 to Thiokol and refund 
only the difference between the amount so determined 
from the formula and the amount that we paid. Let us 
carry it a little further. Does Thiokol have any equity 
in the personal property belonging to the United States 
and used by it on this project? It does not. So the 
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·luity of Thiokol would equal zero and zero times 
·~0 times the tax rate would still be zero. It is abso-
tely absurd. I would also like to ask this question: 
tns this court, or the District Court, the power to levy 
.ad determine taxes or has that power by the State 
~gislature been delegated to certain designated tax-
I officials 1 The Supreme Court of the United States 
; .. spoken on this subject and inasmuch as the de-
ndant. through his counsel, has cited this case in his 
·itf, I would assume he is fully familiar with its subject 
attcr. The case is Moses Lake Homes vs. Grant 
lunty, 365 U.S. 744 (1961), which is the final word. 
here the lower court attempted to do exactly what 
,e defendant is urging this court to do, that is, not 
r 
invalidate the entire tax but only reduce it to what 
·would have been if plaintiff had been placed in the 
me position as people purchasing from the State, and 
e court said, page 751: 
" ... We held in the Dumas case, supra, that 
a discriminatory tax is void and 'may not be 
exacted.' 361 U.S. at 387. The effect of court's 
remand was to direct the District Court to decree 
a valid tax for the invalid one which the State 
had attempted to exact. The District . Court has 
no power so to decree. Federal courts may not 
assess or levy taxes. Only the appropriate tax-
ing officials of Grant County may assess and 
levy taxes on these leaseholds, and the federal 
courts may··determine, within their jurisdiction, 
only whether the tax levied by those officials is 
or is not a valid one. When, as here, the tax is 
invalid, it 'may not be exacted.' Phillips Co. vs. 
Dumas School District, 361 U.S. at 387." 
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The Supreme Court, having held that the theory ad 
vanced by the defendant in his final argument cannol 
be carried out, we will not treat the subject further 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court, we believe, was correct when it said: 
"Now the court is just simply impelled into 
the conclusion that so long as the state is going 
to continue to practice such discrimination, the 
least this court can do is to raise its voice in pro· 
test and decide in favor of the plaintiff and find 
that the tax has been discriminatorily applied. 
"Three. The court finds and determines that 
this statute, this privilege tax, construed together 
with 59-2-2, has been applied and enforced by 
the tax people during 1961 in an unequal and 
dis crimina tory manner to such an extent as to 
nullify the assessment and the tax involved in 
this action." (Rec. 200, 201). 
We believe the court erred when it found that the 
privilege tax is amendatory to Section 59-2-2 and is 
constitutional, notwithstanding the exceptions for re· 
ligious and charitable purposes. We believe that those 
exemptions and exceptions are contrary to our consti· 
tution and in and of themselves would make Section 
59-13-73 unconstitutional. We further believe that 
Section 59-2-2 has not been amended; that Section 
59-13-73 when compared with Section 59-2-2 creates 
statutory discrimination which makes Section 59-13·73 
unconstitutional. 
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Consequently. we respectfully request this court to 
n1stain that part of the judgment which declared that 
:he tax had been discritninatorily applied and that the 
inme was void and of no effect and to declare, by its 
)pinion. that Section 59-13-73 is unconstitutional and 
s in conflict with Section 59-2-2, which has not been 
·epealed by implication or otherwise. 
Respectfully submitted 
'Valter G. Mann 
Attorney for Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant 
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